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THE NEW YORK WILD,
SCENIC AND RECREATIONAL RIVERS
SYSTEM ACT
PETER L. STRAUSS*
New York's recently enacted Wild, Scenic and Recreational Rivers
System Act' names 18 stretches of river, approximating 165 miles, for
immediate special measures of preservation and enhancement of nat-
ural values, and orders study of a more extensive network of streams
for possible addition to the system. Over 80 per cent of the lands
bordering the named rivers are state-owned; as to them, the Act is
principally interesting as an imaginative conservation effort by a state
which traditionally has given its forest lands a high measure of pro-
tection.2 Xhere private lands border the rivers, however, the statute
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; A.B., Harvard, 1961;
LL.B., Yale, 1964.
1. N.Y. CoNsERv. LAW §§ 429-k to -v (McKinney Supp. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as Rivers System Act].
2. Since the turn of the century, article XIV of the New York State constitu-
tion has required that state-owned forest lands-including all the state lands thus
far affected by the law-be kept "forever wild." But wild-ness is not to be con-
fused with wilderness in this context. See generally Note, Permissible Uses of New
York's Forest Preserve Under "Forever Wild," 19 SYRACUSE L. REv. 969 (1968).
The Rivers System Act imposes substantially more rigorous safeguards. While
similar restrictions may be the outcome of a Master Plan for State Lands which
has just been submitted to the Governor by the Adirondack Park Agency, that
plan lacks the permanence of legislative action, and could be changed at any time.
N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 807 (McKinney Supp. 1972). Further, article XIV provides
New York no protection against federal uses of the lands inconsistent with its
dedication as wild forest. Cf. United States v. New York, 160 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 832 (1947); New York Times, Nov. 28, 1971, § 1, at 68,
col. 2. Section 429-s of the Rivers System Act, however, makes it possible to in-
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provides for use restrictions so severe in some cases that many might
conclude they must be purchased through condemnation proceedings.
Yet the Act provides for the payment of "just compensation" only if
an existing use is to be restricted.3 Whether this provision is sufficient
and, if not, what remedies ought to be given are the central concerns
of this comment.
I. THE STATUTE
Like the Federal Wild, Scenic and Recreational Rivers Act,' the
New York statute defines three types of rivers, subject to varying
degrees of control, 5 and names certain rivers in each category.0 The
most stringently regulated are "wild" rivers, which account for 78 of
the 165 designated miles of riverway. Wild rivers are wilderness
rivers, free-flowing, their banks essentially untouched, remote from
the sight and sound of civilization, inaccessible except by water, horse
or foot. Ninety per cent of their banks are publicly owned. "Scenic"
rivers account for 67 miles of the system. Though free-flowing and
far from villages or vacation communities, they are more rural than
wilderness, with limited road access and modest farming or forestry
activities along their banks. About one-third of their banks are in
private hands. "Recreational" rivers account for the remaining 20
miles, all at present in state ownership. These are valued chiefly in
terms of the opportunities for water recreation they provide; their
banks may be readily accessible and developed with occasional towns
or resorts.
Administrative responsibility is placed in the hands of an admin-
istrative agency, generally the Commissioner of Environmental Con-
servation.T For each of the designated streams, the agency is in-
structed to define a "river area" up to one-half mile deep along each
corporate the designated waterways as part of the national wild and scenic rivers
system. Once so designated, they would be substantially protected against federal
as well as state uses inconsistent with their present state. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (Supp.
1972).
3. N.Y. CONSERV. LAw § 429-o (McKinney Supp. 1972).
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-87 (Supp. 1972).
5. N.Y. CoNsERv. LAw § 429-n (McKinney Supp. 1972).
6. Id. § 429-q.
7. Id. § 429-m. Within the Adirondack Park, responsibility for privately owned
lands bordering the rivers is given to the Adirondack Park Agency, which has




shore,8 and then, after an appropriate public hearing,9 to adopt regu-
lations governing use within such areas. Its freedom to shape these
regulations, however, is sharply limited by the statute, which imposes
minimum levels of regulation for each type of river area.
In wild river areas, for example, the Act essentially requires the
maintenance of wilderness conditions; there may be no intrusive
noise, no access by motor vehides, no structures, improvements, or
development of any kind.-0 In scenic river areas, existing agricultural
and modest forestry activities may be permitted to continue, but
mining, excavation and new public road construction are generally
to be prohibited." By implication, residential development is also
prohibited, for the Act specifically permits "small communities as well
as dispersed or duster residential developments" in recreational river
areas,1" without mentioning them here. Regulation in recreational
river areas, generally, is to be quite permissive: there may be roads,
railroads, bridge crossings and "numerous" river access points. 3
The New York Act's almost complete reliance on regulatory meas-
ures, rather than land or easement acquisition, is a striking innova-
tion." In providing for study of possible additions to the system, the
legislature seems to have recognized that in some cases the State might
have to use its eminent domain power to assure the desired levels of
restriction; those studies must report any acquisitions of land or ease-
ments necessary to assure a given use-designation and estimate their
cost.15 But as to the named rivers, the legislature apparently felt that
8. N.Y. CONsERv. LAw § 4 29 -p (McKinney Supp. 1972).
9. Id. § 429-o.
10. Id. § 429-o(1).
11. Id. 429-o(2).
12. Id. § 429-o(3).
13. Id.
14. The Federal Act generally depends on acquisition of scenic easements or, to
a limited extent, fee title to bordering lands. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1277, 1286 (1970);
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3801, 3803. With the exception of segments
passing through urban areas where satisfactory, valid zoning ordinances could be
relied on, 16 U.S.C. § 1277(c) (1970), the federal government-lacking general
powers of land use control-plainly expected to pay for the use restrictions neces-
sary to assure continuance of the designated rivers in their desired state. For
estimates of the costs involved see 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 3804-
07, 3809. See also the 1966 Maine statute establishing the Allagash Wilderness
Waterway which confers both eminent domain and regulatory powers generally
and leaves to the commission administering the waterway the choice of which to
use. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 666-69 (Supp. 1972).
15. N.Y. CONSERV. LAw § 429-r(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
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problems of "taking" would arise only if presently existing uses were
to be restricted. A proviso-said to have been inserted in response to
protests by large landholders in the affected areas-expressly permits
present uses to be continued at or below their present levels, and re-
quires compensation to be paid if an order for their discontinuance
is made.16 The absence of any other provision for compensation is
striking.
II. CONFISCATION?
There is little doubt that New York can restrict activities in the
area bordering designated rivers as a matter of "public" purpose.
Enhancement of public opportunities for recreation and aesthetic
enjoyment in an increasingly crowded and unaesthetic world is now
established as an appropriate base for the exercise of governmental
power.17 The real questions, rather, are whether the state may gen-
erally elect regulation over purchase as the means of accomplishing
the desired restrictions and, to the extent it cannot, what the conse-
quences of a wrong choice would be.
Confiscatory applications of the statute can readily be imagined.
For example, Landowner A owns a one-half acre tract fronting on a
"wild river" and an easement to build a private road for access
through the lands of the company that sold him the property. Crea-
tion of a wild river area will mean that he cannot build his road and
cannot construct the summer home-the prospect of which was the
sole reason for his purchase of the land. Nor is he likely to find a
16. Id. § 429-o. This subsection provides:
Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, existing land uses
within the respective classified river areas may continue, but may not be
altered or expanded except as permitted by the respective classifications, un-
less the commissioner or agency orders the discontinuance of such existing
land use. In the event any land use is so directed to be discontinued, ade-
quate compensation therefore shall be paid by the state of New York either
by agreement with the real property owner, or in accordance with condem-
nation proceedings thereon.
Id.
17. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963);
Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965). If the restrictions
imposed are so severe as to constitute a "taking," the state may use its powers
of condemnation to acquire the desired rights. Cf. Kamrowskl v. State, 31 Wis.
2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966). If they are not, few any longer argue that
the restrictions are inappropriate to the state's police powers. United Advertising
Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964); City of Santa
Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964); Cromwell v. Fer-
rier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
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purchaser for whom it has substantial value; such destruction of ac-
cess, use and value would surely be found confiscatory. s They force
A to bear an economic burden for which he receives no compensating
benefit,- defeating both his reasonable expectations as to use of the
property and his ability to profit from it.
It is characteristic of the areas under consideration, however, that
such small landholdings are uncommon. The typical private land-
holder controlling riverfront property, B, may own a five-mile stretch
of riverbank and the lands behind to an average depth of four miles.
The land was acquired in connection with a mining enterprise or as
forest reserve for a paper mill in an area which for 80 years has been
characterized by strict control of public land and non-development of
private lands. B's recent interest in subdividing the land for vacation
home development more or less coincided with the provision by the
state legislature for comprehensive land development planning in the
area. B's actual use of the half-mile strip, which may be directly
affected by designation of a "wild river area" is virtually nil; a rail-
road traverses one corner of the strip and a mine tailing pile intrudes
one-eighth of a mile into the strip at another point.
Interference with B's present use is specifically dealt with by the
proviso to Section 429-o.20 Whether B will have to stop using the
railroad or the waste pile cannot be known at all until the responsible
agency formally designates the "wild river area," and to avoid such
problems it may exclude those points. But if B is forced to stop,
compensation for those values will be paid. Perhaps B has been
deprived of his periodic harvest of the timber in the protected area;
but even if his present lumbering is in another area, it requires no
great imagination, dealing with a continuous tract of forest lands, to
construe periodic harvesting as an "existing" use as to which B is
entitled to compensation in the event of an order of discontinuance.
Must interference with future uses-in particular, the frustration
of B's subdivision plans insofar as they include the half-mile strip-be
18. Bydlon v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1950); cf. Forster v.
Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893), in which the official map of proposed
streets effectively covered the plaintiff's lot, and thus, "virtually deprived him of
the right to build." Id. at 584-85, 32 N.E. at 977. The official map statute was
found confiscatory, but only as it applied to the lot in question. Id. at 585, 32
N.E. at 977.
19. Cf. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
20. N.Y. CONSERV. LAW § 429-o (McKinney Supp. 1972).
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found confiscatory in every case? This is not the place for an attempt
to scribe the complex and elusive line between takings and the police
power. That is a mammoth theoretical undertaking.21 Responding to
an effort by the New York Court of Appeals which seems to imperil
the State's whole zoning structure,2 a State Commission on Eminent
Domain characterized "the formulation of a simple set of rules" as
"simply impossible." 23  What may be possible is to suggest the
plausibility of fact settings in which B's lands are not specially
harmed by the regulation, or in which any harm to the lands as a
whole does not exceed a degree of impairment which has been
accepted as non-confiscatory in other settings. A court which found
such facts in a particular case would have ample basis for concluding
that confiscation had not occurred. 24 Like regulations which require
21. M~ichelman, Property, Fairness and Utility, 80 Iiv. L. REv. 1165 (1967)
is especially impressive. See also Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Per-
spective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, THE SUPREME COURT
REvIEw 63 (P. Kurland ed. 1962); Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Inte-
gration of the Police Power and Eminent Domain by the Courts, 1968 URBAN L.
ANN. 1; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149
(1971).
22. City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269 N.E.2d 895, 321
N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971). The court held that despite a proven calamitous effect on
value and saleability, an announcement that the property in question would soon
be condemned had not worked a de facto taking because of the absence of any
"direct legal restraint." Contra, Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d
574 (Ct. C1. 1970). In dictum, however, the New York court indicated that a
taking would be found if a "direct legal restraint" was present-if a law or regu-
lation by its "own force and effect deprive[s] owners of property or materially
affect[s] its beneficial use or free enjoyment." 28 N.Y.2d at 256, 269 N.E.2d at
904, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 358. Unless limited to cases in which the law in question
acts in aid of a planned or possible condemnation, e.g., Keystone Associates v.
Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966), or unless
"materially" is the key, cf. Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893),
the dictum seems to encompass most zoning laws. See note 18 supra. In a more
recent decision, the court of appeals found no constitutional flaw in a township
land development plan which restricted subdivision development of entire tracts
for as long as eighteen years. Golden v. Planning Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285
N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972). While the court remarked, by way of con-
trast, that a permanent restriction foreclosing any reasonable use of property would
constitute a taking, id. at -, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154, the
context leaves open the question posed here-whether a taking must be found
when use of only a part of the property is foreclosed and the whole is not subject
to a "diminution of value ... such as to be tantamount to a confiscation." Id. at
-, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
23. 1971 Naw YoRE STATE COMM'N ON EMINENT DOMAIN REP. 114.
24. Compare Rochester Bus. Inst., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 App. Div. 2d
97, 267 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1966) (in which a six per cent cost increase imposed by
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houses to be set so many feet apart or so far back from the road, the
new Act unquestionably interferes with the beneficial use and enjoy-
ment of part of B's property; but the impact on the whole may not
offend our sense of his proper expectations or exceed a level which
we expect all to tolerate.
It is possible, if not entirely likely, that the forced dedication of a
half-mile strip will not impair the value of B's property. 25 If any
private lands were included in recreational river areas (at present,
none are), non-impairment would be virtually certain-responsible
development is to be permitted and the availability of a protected rec-
reational site is likely to enhance the value of neighboring lands. For
scenic and wild river areas, the equation is more complex. One
would have to balance against the loss of development rights on the
bordering strip, the possible values gained in selling vacation homes
by the assurance of a half-mile deep stretch of wilderness or unde-
veloped lands and a protected river. In calculating the overall return
which B could realistically expect from subdivision of his lands, one
might find that development of the river would lower the potential
value of interior sites and one would account, as well, for the fact
that development of the lands as a whole is subject to general regula-
tion without regard to this Act. -6 Since administration of the river
area lands in issue here has been put in the hands of the agency
usually responsible for development generally, such matters as per-
mitted density of development in the lands behind the protected
region might be adjusted with a view to the entire tract, allowing
more sites in the developed area than would ordinarily be the case.
Overall, it is not certain that the owner's economic opportunities
have been reduced.
Even if creation of these restricted zones has an impact on B's
property as a whole, that impact need not be so severe as to constitute
an official map was not a taking), with East Neck Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger, 61
Misc. 2d 619, 305 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (in which a 45 per cent diminu-
tion in value imposed by a forced dedication of park lands was held confiscatory),
and Forstcr v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893). See note 18 supra.
25. The fact of forced dedication alone need not be construed to require a find-
ing of confiscation, even though the statute reflects recreational needs of the com-
munity as well as hypothetical lot purchasers in foreclosing the development of
designated lands. Associated Home Bldrs. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d
633, 637-40, 484 P.2d 606, 610-11, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634-35 (1971).
26. Supra note 18. Cf. Fonoroff, Proposed Legislation for Highway Corridor
Protection, 1968 URBAN L. ANN. 128.
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a taking. A possibly instructive analogy here is that of historic site
preservation. The argument for preservation is much the same-
rivers designated as "wild" by the New York legislature are essentially
the only such streams remaining and are as irreplaceable to their
devotees and as evocative of a fading past as, say, the building hous-
ing the Manhattan Club. If the proportions are right, as they seem
to be, prohibitions on tampering with the front half-mile seem rather
like rules against changing the exterior architecture of an appro-
priately designated historic building. Questions may arise in particu-
lar cases whether the effect of that prohibition on the owner is so
burdensome that the State cannot enforce it without payment;2 7 but
the statute itself is valid and the owner who is able to maintain a
reasonably profitable use has no compensation claim even though his
return is somewhat less than he could obtain if the restriction did
not apply.28 The general acceptance of such an approach is reflected,
inter alia, in Sections 2-209 and 2-210 of the Second Tentative Draft
(1970) of the American Law Institute's Model Land Development
Code.29 For the protection of special natural areas, if not green space
generally, the same approach has much to commend it.
To be sure, this line of argument depends on the proposition that
the taking question will be resolved with an eye to the whole of B's
property adjacent to the river zone, and that is a proposition which
has not always been accepted.30 But in the absence of a particular
reason for differentiation-such as a physical invasion of B's property
or bona fide construction, sales or other dedication to use premised
particularly on the availability of the half-mile strip-B should have
a hard time persuading that only that strip should be considered in
passing on the condemnation question. Whether the question is
defeat of B's reasonable and sharply defined expectations,31 or the
27. See note 24 supra. To the extent that the expectations form part of the
assessment of burdensomeness traditions of non-development in this area and the
fact of non-development on B's lands make the burden less heavy than it would
be, for instance, in the suburbs. Michelman, supra note 21, at 1238-42.
28. See Trustees of Sailors Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 App. Div. 2d 376, 288
N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968); Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n, 51
Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
29. See also Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and The Preservation
of Historic Property, 63 COLUm. L. Rlv. 708 (1963).
30. Compare Rochester Bus. Inst., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 App. Div. 2d
97, 267 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1966), with Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 268 Pa. 189,
82 A.2d 34 (1951).
31. Michelman, supra note 21, at 1233.
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possible unfairness of his being made to bear burdens which should
be borne by the public as a whole,32 or the extent to which the profit-
making capacity of his property has been impairedp 3 it cannot reason-
ably be answered by considering only the burdens imposed by the
State's action, and not its possible benefits. Any benefits the statute
has created by preserving an otherwise inaccessible wilderness or
undeveloped scenic area next to B's developable lands are quite
properly viewed as special to those lands.34
III. WNrHAT REMEDY, IF CONFISCATION Is FOUND?
A court faced with a particular case in which it concludes confisca-
tion has occurred ought to be hesitant about fashioning a remedy
which extends beyond the case before it. Plainly, the statute as a
whole cannot be struck down. In the case of public lands, the ques-
tion of confiscation simply does not arise; ordinary application of
severability principles would suffice to save the statute as it applies to
them. And if one form of regulation-say, the restrictions associated
with "recreational river areas"-is in no case confiscatory, that much
of the statute, too, may readily be preserved. But even in dealing
with private lands and a degree of regulation as to which confiscation
might be found, simple invalidation of the statute would be im-
proper.
If the question whether this new statute has "confiscated" interests
in the private lands it restricts can only be decided with respect to
particular holdings, the relief given should also be limited to those
lands?; Nor should the relief given as to particular lands be limited
to an injunction forbidding enforcement of the statute as to those
lands. The designated rivers, like historic buildings, are a dwindling
resource, which once developed cannot be replaced. That and the
very elusiveness of the distinction between proper exercise of police
power and confiscatory regulation argue that any judicial remedy
for confiscation which may be found in particular cases should pre-
serve the statute's application to the maximum possible degree.
32. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
33. Sax, supra note 21, at 149.
34. Petkus v. State Highway Comm'n, 24 Wis. 2d 643, 130 N.W.2d 253 (1964);
Haar & Herring, The Determination of Benefits in Land Acquisition, 51 CALIF. L.
Rv. 833 (1963).
35. Cf. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Forster v. Scott,
136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893).
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Suppose the judgment that while "wild river area" regulation of
the lands in question would be confiscatory, regulation of these lands
under the less severe restrictions applying to a "scenic river area" or
even "recreational river area" would present no such problems.
Could a court excuse the landowner only from "wild river" regula-
tion, in effect amending the statutory identification of the river from
wild to scenic or recreational? Ruling the area free of any control
would be the most substantial frustration of legislative judgment;
one may with some confidence venture that if told that the choice
was between "scenic river" regulation of private lands in wild river
areas or none at all, the legislature would choose the former. Clearly
enough from the statutory definitions, any river which qualifies as
"wild" is also "scenic."
Some courts might hesitate to do what they conceive as the legisla-
ture's work; yet, the categories already exist in the statute and to say
that a finding of "confiscation" requires, in effect, striking the par-
ticular stream from the statute entirely is an even more forceful form
of judicial amendment. Nor does the due process clause compel
that drastic a step; what it forbids is a taking without compensation,
and if this may be avoided in a manner which preserves the evident
legislative scheme to a substantial degree, the due process clause
has nothing to say. The extent to which judges may or will engage
in reconstruction of statutory schemes is not a matter which can use-
fully be treated here;36 the importance of the issue, the effect of
simply ending regulation, the court's view of its role in the political
structure and its feeling regarding its ability to resolve a dispute
decisively, in a single decision, all appear to play a part. But, for a
court sometimes willing to do so, this is a relatively simple case: the
effect of ending regulation would be calamitous for the values sought
to be preserved; the issue is an important one at present; and since
the statute already provides standards and procedures regarding all
three types of rivers, the judicial involvement would be both minimal
and brief.
A different approach would be that sometimes suggested in dis-
cussions of inverse condemnation-to permit the state its regulation
in all cases, but to require just compensation as a condition of its tak-
ing effect where that regulation is found confiscatory. Most often, the
36. Compare Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419 (1970) with United States v.
Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 368-73 (1971).
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inverse condemnation remedy is put forward as a mandatory remedy,
compelling payment in all cases. This approach seems neither war-
ranted nor wise here. As a matter of statutory construction, it would
seem strained to conclude that a legislature which required condem-
nation proceedings only when present uses were ordered discontinued
had directed compensation to be paid in every case where the restric-
tions on future use were found confiscatory. And, in the article with
which the Urban Law Annuals existence began, Professor Beuscher
has shown serious policy objections to a mandatory payment remedy: 37
unplanned and possibly overwhelming costs; pressure to use condem-
nation from the outset, rather than regulation, to avoid uncertainty;
and a transfer to the judiciary from the legislature of the function of
deciding whether and how much to pay for public programs.
These objections may be largely avoided, however, if the remedy
is made conditional, permitting the state to avoid injunctive relief by
the payment of just compensation within a stated time. Since the
legislature or responsible administrator retains control of the choice
whether or not to pay, the conditional remedy avoids the financial
and political effects of uncertainty which were said to be the greatest
drawbacks of the inverse condemnation remedy. This alternative is
discussed in the Report of the New York State Commission on Emi-
nent Domain~s and questioned there on the ground that it raises its
own constitutional problems. It deprives the owner of the use of his
property for the interim period while the administrator or legislature
is deciding whether or not to pay; if the decision is to permit the
injunction (against further regulation) to go into effect, will payment
be made for the interim period? And if not, has not the remedy
effected its own taking, albeit to a lesser degree?39
One response might be to distinguish the cases adopting such rea-
soning on the basis that there the private parties had already begun
a course of development when suspension was imposed. More harm,
it might be argued, is done by interruption than by postponement.
Second, the need to fix a value for the interim period may never
arise. Given the state's commitment to conservation, state officials
37. Bcuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of the Police Power and
Eminent Domain by the Courts, 1968 URDAN L. ANN. 1.
38. Supra note 23, at 111-13.
39. Keystone Associates v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278
N.YS.2d 183 (1966); Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34
(1951).
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may always decide to proceed by condemnation in cases where the
regulation imposed is found to be confiscatory. More to the point,
perhaps, is that the statute under consideration here can be con-
strued to avoid this particular problem. It specifically makes any
interference with present use a taking, compensable in condemnation
proceedings. Given the provision for study of acquisition costs for
future additions to the system, that provision may be judicially con-
strued as a commitment to pay the value of the uses foregone during
the time taken by the state to reach its decision. As a practical mat-
ter, it can be doubted whether such damages will occur. But the evi-
dent purpose to make owners whole for takings of present uses could
be read to include them, in the service of avoiding a more devastating
impact on the statutory scheme.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is plain that this statute "walk[s] to the brink of [the legisla-
ture's] constitutional powers" 40 and, in some circumstances, probably
falls over. That is a question of which judicial resolution must and,
in all likelihood, will be had. The more serious issue is how much of
the statute will survive the fall. As we tend towards increasingly
stringent restriction of private land use, it is inevitable that the brink
will frequently be encountered. Must the legislature which has mis-
read its location-a tracing which, some have said, "is simply impossi-
ble"4I'-pay the price of a complete loss of validity of its regulatory
scheme? That result would be surprising. While its possible effect of
steering legislatures marginally away from police power projects and
into use of condemnation could be defended as a suitable "margin of
protection" for individual property rights, "all or nothing" is a harsh
stake for which to play. That is especially so where, as here, freeing
the lands from regulation, even temporarily, is likely to lead to an
irreplaceable resource loss, and private property rights can be com-
pletely protected by lesser measures.
40. Supra note 37, at 2.
41. Supra note 23.
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